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Abstract: In the past couple of decades, scholars have predominantly employed
rent-seeking models to analyze litigation problems. In this paper, we build on
the existing literature to show how alternative fee-shifting arrangements (e.g.,
the American rule and English rule with limited fee-shifting) affect parties’
litigation expenditures and their decisions to litigate. Contrary to the prevailing
wisdom, we discover that, when fee shifting is limited, the English rule presents
some interrelated advantages over the American rule, including the reduction of
litigation rates and the possible reduction of expected litigation expenditures.
Our results unveil a hidden virtue of limited fee shifting, showing that an
increase in such limit may lead to a desirable sorting of socially valuable
litigation.
Keywords: litigation, limited fee-shifting, rent-seeking, English rule, American rule
JEL Classifications: C72, D72, K41.

1 Introduction
It is a great irony that when parties go to court, the cost of litigation may grow
equal to or greater than the very object of the dispute.1 Given that litigation costs

1 See, e.g., Popov v. Hayashi, No. 400545, 2002 WL 833731 (Cal. Super. Dec. 18, 2002). In this
justly notorious case, the two litigants claimed ownership of a record-setting home run ball hit
by Barry Bonds, of which they had both held possession during a scuffle after the ball flew into
the stands. The trial court pronounced the unusual ruling that the ball be auctioned off and the
proceeds split among the two litigants. The ball sold for $450,000, of which each party received
*Corresponding author: Emanuela Carbonara, Department of Economics, University of Bologna,
Bologna, Italy; Johns Hopkins University – SAIS Europe, Bologna, Italy, E-mail:
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tend to be substantial, it is a serious policy question whether each party should
bear its own legal expenses, or whether the litigation costs ought to be rolled
into the stake. Jurisdictions around the world diverge on this question and there
exist many variations – even within the common-law tradition – in the assignment of litigation costs. Nevertheless, we may reduce the assignment of costs to
two main alternatives: (i) the “American rule”, under which each litigant bears
her own legal costs, and (ii) the “English rule” (or “Continental rule”, under
which the loser pays the litigation costs of the winner.2 Traditionally, legal
scholars justify the English approach – shifting fees on the losing party –
primarily on grounds of fairness. That is, if the desired consequence of litigation
is to make the winning party “whole,” then this ought to include the costs
expended in litigation (Kritzer, 2002).3
However, scholars and policymakers have also recognized that, even though
the principal goal in a “loser-pays” regime may be to make the winning litigant
whole, fee-shifting creates significant secondary effects on the incentives of
prospective litigants. In this paper, we explore the choice of fee-shifting policies
through the lens of a rent-seeking model. We discuss the effects of alternative
fee-shifting rules, considering both total and partial recovery of litigation costs
by the winning litigant. Building on the existing literature, we focus on the
effects of alternative fee-shifting arrangements on parties’ litigation choices. By
looking at the selection of cases under the various regimes, we show that the
English rule (possibly complemented by limited – or partial – fee-shifting) can

$225,000. The plaintiff Popov’s legal expenses alone exceeded $470,000, for which his lawyers
later sued. See generally Peter Adomeit, The Barry Bonds Baseball Case – An Empirical Approach
– Is Fleeting Possession Five Tenths of the Ball?, 48 St. Louis U. L.J. 475, 502 (2004).
2 Although the “loser-pays” rule can be traced back to 13th century English law (hence its
name), its use and adoption is mostly associated with Continental European systems. The
applications of the “loser-pays” rule in European systems entails fee-shifting in favor of the
winning litigant, regardless of whether the winning party is the plaintiff or the defendant. The
loser-pays rule represents an important principle of European systems of civil procedure and is
expressed in European codes of civil procedure. Bungard (2006) provides an interesting survey
of the different incarnations of the loser-pays rule in European systems, as exemplified by 41 of
the Austrian code; article 1017 of the Belgian code; 312(1) of the Danish code; article 696 of the
French code; 91 of the German code; article 91 of the Italian code; article 56 of the code of
Netherlands; 172 of the Norwegian code; ch. 18, 1 of the Swedish code.
3 Loser-pays rules are not used in criminal cases. Public prosecution bears the cost of its
prosecutorial efforts and defendants bear the cost of their defense, regardless of the case
outcome. Garoupa and Parisi (2006) and Garoupa and Echazu (2012) observe that a criminal
defendant that is found not guilty is not compensated for his or her defense costs, and explore
the idea of applying a loser-pays rule in criminal cases.
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effectively reduce total litigation while promoting a greater proportion of
socially valuable litigation.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 1, we review the existing
literature. In Section 2, we recast the standard rent-seeking model in the context
of litigation, under alternative fee-shifting arrangements. In Section 3, we study
the American rule. In Section 4, we discuss alternative fee-shifting regimes,
providing a novel analysis of the equilibria of the English rule with limited
fee-shifting. In Section 5 we unveil a hidden virtue of the English rule with
limited fee-shifting: efficient sorting of the cases that are brought to litigation
with the adjudication of a higher percentage of disputes involving unsettled
legal issues. Litigation of cases with unsettled legal issues is socially valuable,
as the decision of those issues will foster clarity in the law.4 We find that the
English rule may lead to an interesting crowding-out effect, reducing less desirable cases and allowing court resources to be used for the decision of socially
valuable cases. This is particularly true when the limit to fee-shifting is low and
the applied English rule is close to the American rule.5 However, we also
discover that limiting the amount of fee-shifting may lead to an increase in
total litigation expenditures for a society, an apparent paradox. In Section 6 we
proceed to a comparison of the American and English rules, showing that the
overdissipation problem identified by Farmer and Pecorino (1999) is mitigated
when courts limit the litigation fees recoverable through fee-shifting. Further, as
a bright side to more expensive litigation, we show that litigation becomes less
appealing, and litigation rates drop. Therefore, expected litigation costs may
be lower under the English rule than under the American rule. In Section 7, we
conclude with some policy considerations and suggestions for future research.
Appendices A and B contain technical material.

1.1 Related literature
As pointed out by Congleton et al. (2008:41), “civil law proceedings are rentseeking contests in which the ‘prize’ is dissipated through conflict.”6 When
parties litigate, they normally expend resources to improve their odds of winning.
These expenditures include the cost of investigating the case, expert witnesses,
and, of course, lawyer fees. Generally, the more a party spends on litigation, the

4 One-time litigants do not draw any benefit from the greater legal certainty promoted by their
case decision. On the private and social incentives to litigate see Shavell (1997).
5 The American rule can also be seen as a rule with limited fee-shifting, where the limit is set to zero.
6 See also Luppi and Parisi (2014).
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better its chances of success. Economists describe such situations, where parties
expend resources to improve their share of (or probability of winning) a fixed
stake as “rent-seeking,” which is how the law and economics literature has
predominantly analyzed litigation costs. Braeutigam et al. (1984), Katz (1988),
and Hause (1989) laid the groundwork for rent-seeking analysis, modelling court
decisions as parties’ success functions with the parties’ expenses as variables.
Katz (1987) applied the model to fee-shifting parties’ expenses in a litigation
context. Farmer and Pecorino (1999) and Hirshleifer and Osborne (2001) offered
refinements to the model, and Kobayashi and Lott (1996) applied the model to
plea bargaining in criminal cases. Chen and Wang (2007) and Baik and Kim
(2007a, 2007b) introduced moral hazard considerations in the lawyer-client relationship with respect to rules on contingent and conditional fees. Rowe (1982)
examined the rationales for alternative fee-shifting schemes, arguing that the
justification for the English rule is that the winner should be made whole, and
therefore the winner’s litigation costs should be recoverable. Thus, the English
rule accomplishes the dual objectives of (i) making a wrongdoer fully internalize
the financial consequences of the dispute, and (ii) deterring frivolous litigation.
Notable studies of litigation that utilize rent-seeking models include Tullock
(1975), Farmer and Pecorino (1999), Hirshleifer and Osborne (2001), Parisi
(2002), Baye et al. (2005), and Luppi and Parisi (2012).7 Auspiciously, the rentseeking framework provides a tractable method of endogenizing parties’ litigation decisions and of comparing litigation rates and expenditures under the
English and American rules. Farmer and Pecorino (1999) were the first to
compare and contrast the effects of the two fee-shifting regimes in a rent-seeking
context. However, their analysis relied on the simplifying assumption that the
English rule entailed full and unlimited reimbursement of litigation expenditures by the losing party. In their model, the English rule lead to an exacerbation
of the litigation incentives, such as to lead parties to exit litigation at the point
where returns to rent-seeking efforts r > 1=2. However, the assumption of full
reimbursement is unrealistic as in practice, fee-shifting tends to be only partial.
Baumann and Friehe (2010) use a rent-seeking model to compare the American
and the English rule – the latter both with unlimited and limited reinbursement –
when compensations schemes for lawyers are based on contingent fees. They
use a specific model with constant returns to investment in litigation and where
both parties have the same merits. Moreover, they do not analyze the parties’

7 For a comprehensive survey of the applications of rent-seeking models to litigation and feeshifting arrangements, see Congleton et al. (2008: chapter 3.2), as well as the contributions by
Hillman (2012) and Higgins et al. (1985).
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participation constraints, namely, they consider that litigants are involved in
litigation with no exit options.8
In this paper, we consider a refined and more realistic version of the English
rule under which courts impose a limit on recoverable litigation expenditures.
The English rule with limited fee-shifting has been previously studied by Hyde
and Williams (2002) in a model in which parties have divergent beliefs about
their probability of victory. They consider the effects of different reimbursement
limits on legal expenditures, including the impact of uncertainty. Particularly,
they find the conditions under which legal expenditures monotonically increase
with the amount of costs that can be shifted and prove that uncertainty about
such amount has an ambiguous effect on such expenditures. However, just as
Baumann and Friehe (2010), Hyde and Williams (2002) also omit to consider the
parties’ participation constraints.9 In this paper we use their definition of limited
fee-shifting, adapting it to the standard Tullock success function. Using the
latter function, we reconstruct the argument of Katz (1987). As Farmer and
Pecorino (1999), we allow for different degrees of effectiveness of litigation
expenditures and for different merits of the case. We begin with an analysis of
the American rule and then turn to the English rule, explicitly considering
limited fee-shifting. Consistent with Farmer and Pecorino (1999) and Katz
(1987),10 we find that allowing unlimited recovery of litigation expenditures by
the winning party may create severe problems of overdissipation, even given
moderate returns to effort. We find however that overdissipation problems are
mitigated when limited fee-shifting is introduced. We find that limited feeshifting may still lead to an increase in litigation expenditures when compared
to the American rule, but we also find that it generates multiple offsetting
advantages. Indeed, we will show that, even in the absence of any regulation
of the level of lawyers’ fees, the rule of limited fee-shifting will be desirable for a
wide range of scale economies and diseconomies. Particularly, we generate
policy considerations completely different from Farmer and Pecorino (1999)
and Baumann and Friehe (2010). The former paper states that the English rule
will not produce desirable outcomes when returns to effort are relatively high.
This is because it is likely that, even if the objective merits of the case favor the

8 See Farmer and Pecorino (1999) and Luppi and Parisi (2012).
9 Participation constrainsts are extremely important. Not only their shape determines the range
of cases that are litigated, it also determines which claims will be brought to the settle-versuslitigate stage and be settled out of court. See Reinganum and Wilde (1986) on the effect of the
allocation of litigation costs on settlement and, more importantly, on the equilibrium probability of trial.
10 See his argument in the “Extensions and Conclusions,” Katz (1987:173).
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defendant, the latter chooses to give in and settle if the plaintiff files suit. With
limited fee-shifting this undesirable outcome is limited. Particularly, high
returns to effort are the condition for the occurrence of the positive sorting of
cases that are brought to litigation, a feature that exactly offsets the problem
highlighted by Farmer and Pecorino (1999). This is especially interesting, since
several studies on American data suggest that the empirically relevant range for
the returns-to-effort parameters is exactly the range in which the positive sorting
we highlight occurs.11 Particularly, Hughes and Snyder (1995) provide some
interesting empirical evidence for the English Rule practiced in the US. Using
data from Florida (in which the English Rule was applied to medical malpractice
cases between 1980 and 1985), they find that the English rule increased the rate
of plaintiff success at trial but also out-of-court settlements. They also find that
the value of the cases brought to court increased, as proxied by the size of
average jury awards. They interpret these results as indicating that the overall
quality of the cases that were either settled or litigated improved and this
supports out theoretical findings.
Baumann and Friehe (2010) present results that go against a policy of
reimbursement of legal fees, whereas not only we find that the English rule
might have sound advantages of the American rule, but we also show that these
effects become more pronounced when the limits to fee shifting are loosened.

2 Litigation as rent-seeking: setting the stage
Following Katz (1987) and Farmer and Pecorino (1999), we consider a dispute in
which a risk neutral plaintiff must decide whether to sue a risk neutral defendant for damages. Let us denote the plaintiff’s stake as V > 0. The plaintiff and
the defendant invest X and Y, respectively, in legal expenditures. The efforts
exert a probabilistic influence on the outcome of the case. Let μ  0 denote
the merit of the plaintiff’s complaint in a particular case. Low values of μ
represent weak claims, while high values represent strong claims. Particularly,
if μ ¼ 1 both parties’ claims have the same merit, whereas μ  1 indicates that
the objective merits of the case favor the plaintiff, whereas μ < 1 implies a
stronger case for the defendant. We treat μ as an exogenous parameter, and
assume both the factual and legal grounds for the claim are represented in that
value.

11 See Farmer and Pecorino (1999) and papers cited therein.
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As in Katz (1988), we use the standard Tullock success-function to denote
the probability of either party winning the case. We define the probability that
the plaintiff wins by:
μ Xr
P P ðX; YÞ ¼ r
½1
Y þ μX r
Similarly, we define the probability that the defendant will win by:
P D ðX; YÞ ¼

Yr
:
Y r þ μX r

½2

where r determines the effectiveness of legal expenditures.12 It follows
trivially from the definitions that if one party refrains from investing in
litigation, the other party wins the case.13 In the limiting case, where neither
party invests in litigation, let PP ð0; 0Þ ¼ 0 and P D ð0; 0Þ ¼ 1. This assumption
merely indicates that if the plaintiff makes no effort in litigation his probabilities to win the case are null. In other words, the default is in favor of the
defendant: an unsuccessful filing for the plaintiff is equivalent to a victory by
the defendant.
The choice of the default adjudication rule is immaterial for the purpose of
our results. Hence, we could think of different default rules. For instance, the
court faced with an unsupported claim and an unsupported defense could
adjudicate the case with equal probabilities in favor of plaintiff or defendant.14
Alternatively, if the jurisdiction adopts an inquisitorial procedural system, the
court could assess the merits of the claim through independent fact-finding,
even in the absence of active involvement by the litigants. Then, the probability
for the plaintiff to win the case would reflect the intrinsic merits of the claim,
μ
1 15
P P ð0; 0Þ ¼ 1þμ
and P D ð0; 0Þ ¼ 1þμ
.
Now, observe that the rent-seeking game played by the plaintiff and defendant is a sequential game. The plaintiff moves first, deciding whether to file the
case (we call this the “filing stage”), after which the defendant decides whether

12 See Katz (1988) and Dari-Mattiacci and Parisi (2012).
13 If X > 0 and Y ¼ 0, then PP ðX; 0Þ ¼ 1, and PD ðX; 0Þ ¼ 0. Likewise, if X ¼ 0 and Y > 0, then
PP ð0; YÞ ¼ 0 and P D ð0; YÞ ¼ 1.
14 In standard contests, outside of litigation, the default allocation of rights may vary according to the circumstances. For example, in a competitive contest, two competitors who enter
exerting no effort may have an equal chance of winning P P ð0; 0Þ ¼ PD ð0; 0Þ ¼ 21.
15 Note that the same probabilities of success would result when the jurisdiction adopts an
adversarial system and both parties expend a positive amount of effort of litigation in
equilibrium.
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to litigate or to forgo defense and pay the claim amount V (“defense stage”).16
Finally, the plaintiff and the defendant play a the simultaneous Tullock-Katz
game with success functions as defined by eqs [1] and [2] (“litigation stage”). The
choices are illustrated in Figure 1.

Figure 1: The litigation game.

3 The American rule
Under the American rule, both parties bear their own legal expenses, irrespective of the result. Thus, their expected payoffs are:
P ðX; YÞ ¼

μX r
V X
Y r þ μX r

½3

for the plaintiff and,
D ðX; YÞ ¼ 

μX r
V Y
Y r þ μX r

½4

for the defendant.

16 One should note that we consider the “no defense” option a sort of settlement. This might
imply that the defendant accepts some default decree (possibly not even showing up in court)
and simply pays V. We are aware that, in many legal systems, the judge might already allocate
legal fees. However, these would most likely be fixed costs for the parties, not influencing the
chances of winning at trial and would not change our results. In order to save on notation and
with no loss of generality, we have normalized these costs to zero.
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The parties seek to maximize their payoffs by choosing X and Y to maximize
[3] and [4] respectively. The first order conditions are:
@P
r X r1 Y r
¼
μV  1 ¼ 0
@X
ðY r þ μX r Þ2

½5

@D
r Y r1 X r
μV  1 ¼ 0
¼
@Y
ðY r þ μX r Þ2

½6

The equilibrium levels of investment are symmetric:17
X ¼ Y  ¼

r μV

½7

ð1 þ μÞ2

The equilibrium payoffs for the plaintiff and the defendant are, respectively:


μV
r
P ðX ; Y Þ ¼
1
ð1 þ μÞ
1þμ




D ðX  ; Y  Þ ¼ 



μV
r
1þ
ð1 þ μÞ
1þμ

½8

½9

The total cost of litigation under the American rule is
LA ¼ X  þ Y  ¼

2 rμV
ð1 þ μÞ2

½10

Following Farmer and Pecorino (1999), the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of
the litigation game under the American rule is charachterized below. If r  1,
there is a unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in the litigation game under
the American rule, in which the plaintiff always files the case and the defendant
always litigates. Regardless of the parties’ relative stakes, equilibrium effort [7]
is relatively low. This implies that both parties face relatively low costs of
litigation compared to the value of the case and litigation is always a desirable
strategy.
For higher r (particularly, when r > 1 but less than 2), effort and costs are
higher in the litigation equilibrium, hence relative stakes play a role.
Particularly, if μ is very low (μ < r  1), the plaintiff’s merit in the case is too
low to justify filing. In equilibrium, the plaintiff’s effort and costs are high, but
the plaintiff also faces a relatively high probability to lose (due to the

17 See Tullock (1980) and Farmer and Pecorino (1999).
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1
defendant’s high effort and merit). Similarly, if μ is very high (μ > r1
), the
defendant’s probability of winning the case is low, so that the defendant
might forgo defense and pay V avoiding litigation. The plaintiff would choose
to file, and the dispute would be resolved without further litigation.18
In addition, from expression [10] defining LA , it is possible to demonstrate
that total litigation expenditures LA never exceed the amount at stake V under
the American rule when r  2 and though when r > 2, LA might exceed V, recall
that the participation constraint of at least one of the parties is violated when
r > 1.

4 The English rule
We now turn to the English rule, under which the loser pays both his or her own
litigation costs as well as those of the winner.
No legal regime currently uses a “pure” English rule. Unlimited fee-shifting
does not exist “in the wild,” and any legal system using the English rule sensibly
sets limitations on recoverable litigation expenses, based on the reasonableness
and proportionality of legal expenditures. Bungard (2006) observes that the
most common limitation to fee-shifting is that the winning party is only entitled
to reimbursement of those costs that were necessary to assert its rights or
defense and to obtain a favorable court decision, thereby discouraging unnecessary and costly litigation. We therefore focus on the more realistic and
interesting policy of limited fee-shifting.19
Under a limited fee-shifting regime, the losing party must compensate the
winning party’s expenditures, but only up to a given threshold. For simplicity,
let’s assume that the fee-shifting limits are symmetrical and equal to d.
Plaintiff and defendant’s expected payoff from spending X and Y when the
fee-shifting limit is d are given by


P ðX; YÞ ¼ P P ðX; YÞ½V  maxf0; X  dg  1  P P ðX; YÞ ½X þ minfY; dg
½11

18 See Appendix A.
19 Limitations on fee-shifting are generally imposed on the basis of the “reasonableness” of the
expenditures for the assertion and defense of the legal rights in question. Bungard (2006) offers
several examples of limits imposed by European systems on the amounts of recoverable
expenses. For example, Sweden disallows recovery for the costs associated with unnecessary
motions. Austria, Denmark, England, and Germany and other countries disallow fee-shifting for
uneconomical procedural acts.
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D ðY; XÞ ¼ P P ðX; YÞ½V  Y  minfX; dg  1  P P ðX; YÞ maxf0; Y  dg
½12
In the subsequent subsections we will consider the following equilibria under
limited fee-shifting:
1. For very small d, the limited-fee-shifting rule is very similar to the American
rule. Both parties spend an amount greater than the upper limit: Y; X > d,
only a part of the winner’s expenses is paid for by the loser.
2. For very large d, the limited-fee-shifting rule is similar to the English rule as
it is discussed in the literature. Both parties choose equilibrium investmentlevels below the upper limit: 0 < Y; X < d, the loser completely indemnifies
the winner for his legal expenses.
In between these extremes, one or both parties invest exactly as much as they
get indemnified for in case of winning the case.
a. For small intermediate d, both parties spend an amount exactly equal to the
limit: X ¼ Y ¼ d;
b. For large intermediate d, The party with the weaker case spends less than
the limit and the other party spends an amount exactly equal to the limit:
X < Y ¼ d if μ < 1 and Y < X ¼ d if μ > 1.
Note that an equilibrium with one party spending more than the limit and the
other spending less than or exactly the amount of the limit does not exist. We
provide the proof in Appendix B.1. The careful reader of the following sections
will also note that case 2 may only occur if r < 1.
We start our discussion with the equilibria of the litigation stage and then
turn to the earlier stages of the game. For the following sections, it may be
helpful for the reader to consider Figure 2, which visualizes the ranges of r, μ
and d for which the various equilibria are relevant.

4.1 Investment is higher than the indemnification limit
In this case, from [11] and [12], the expected payoff functions are given by
P ðX; Y Þ ¼

ðY r

D ðY; X Þ ¼ 

μX r
ðV þ 2dÞ  X  d
þ μX r Þ

½13

μX r
ðV þ 2dÞ  Y þ d
þ μX r

½14

Yr
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Figure 2: Location of equilibrium types for (a) and (b) r < 1=2, r < 1=2, (c) 1=2 < r < 1,
^ d

(d) r ¼ 1:25 > 1. The scale of the vertical axis shrinks from (a) to (d). Solid lines represent d,
e
~
and d from bottom to top; note that d does not exist for r  1 (Graph (d)). Dashed and dotted
lines are the participation constraints μpD ðdÞ and μpP ðdÞ, respectively. Areas are marked
according to subgame perfect equilibria: gray is “litigation”, white is “not file” or “not defend”
as marked.

Leaving aside the fixed last terms in both equations, these payoffs are exactly
those of the American rule with V þ 2d as the claim value. Equilibrium expenditures are thus
^ ¼ Y^ ¼ rμðV þ 2dÞ
X
ðμ þ 1Þ2

½15

whereas equilibrium payoffs are:


^ X
^ ¼ μðV þ 2dÞðμ þ 1  rÞ  d
P Y;
ðμ þ 1Þ2

½16
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^ X
^ ¼  μðV þ 2dÞðμ þ 1 þ rÞ þ d;
D Y;
ðμ þ 1Þ2

125

½17

Total litigation expenditure is given by
^ þ Y^ ¼ 2rμðV þ 2dÞ
^E ¼ X
L
ðμ þ 1Þ2

½18

^ ¼ Y^ > d, which is equivalent to
By definition, this equilibrium requires that X
^;
d<d

rV
max½ð1 þ μÞð1 þ 1=μÞ  2r; 0

½19

Figure 2 depicts this limit for various r < 4.20 In Appendix B.2 we also show that
^
^ ¼ Y^ > d is the unique equilibrium if d < d.
X
The Nash equilibrium of the litigation stage is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the entire litigation game only if the defendant participates, i.e. if he
chooses

to defend at the defense stage. Obviously, he will do so if and only if
^ X
^  V, which reduces to the following participation constraint:
D Y;
^D ; V
d<d

1 þ 1=μ  r
max½μ  1=μ þ 2r; 0

½20

Finally, the plaintiff also has to file, knowing that the defendant will defend or
not according to eq. [20]. If the defendant will not defend, it is always worthwhile for the plaintiff

 to file. If the defendant will defend, the plaintiff will file if
^ Y^  0, which reduces to
and only if P X;
^P ; V
d<d

1þμr
max½1=μ  μ þ 2r; 0

½21

^ and d
^P > d
^ for all μ so that
^D > d
We show in Appendix B.2 that r  1=2 implies d
^
^
X ¼ Y > d is the equilibrium of the entire litigation game whenever it is the
equilibrium in the litigation stage. On the other hand, r  2 implies that either
^D or d
^P may be positive but not both, so that litigation will not occur, i.e.
d
^D
^ ¼ Y^ > d is never an equilibrium. Then, the plaintiff will file whenever d  d
X
because the defendant will not defend so that the plaintiff wins the case.
Between these two limiting cases, i.e. for 1=2 < r < 2, there are always some
^D and d
^P are positive
values of μ sufficiently close to unity for which both d
^¼Y
^ > d is an equilibrium of the entire litigation game for
which implies that X
^ d
^P ; d
^D . Figure 2 visualizes the
sufficiently small d, specifically for d < min½d;
^
^
different cases: in the plots (a) and (b) dD and dP do not exist and litigation
^ is strictly positive. We will briefly discuss the
20 r < 4 guarantees that the denominator of d
effect of r > 4 in Appendix B.2.
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^ due to r < 1=2; in plots (c) and (d) litigation with
occurs for all d < d
^ d
^P ; d
^D .
^
^
X ¼ Y ¼ X ¼ Y > d occurs only when d < min½d;

4.2 Investment is lower than the indemnification limit
In this case there is full fee-shifting, since parties spend less than the limit. The
expected payoff functions become
P ðX; Y Þ ¼

μX r
ðV þ Y þ X Þ  X  Y
ðY r þ μX r Þ

½22

and
D ðY; X Þ ¼ 

μX r
ðV þ X þ Y Þ:
Y r þ μX r

½23

Equilibrium expenditures are given by
e¼
X




1
r
1 1
e ¼ r V 1 þ μ1r1
; Y
V 1 þ μ1r
1r
1r

½24

e¼Y
e ¼ 1 for r  1. X
e is always increasing and Y
e is always
for < 1 and X
decreasing in μ, if r < 1.
As evidenced above, the party favored by the merits spends more and has a
higher probability of success, in contrast with the American rule, which has
symmetrical equilibrium levels of investment. The parties’ payoffs are








V 
1 1
1 1
e
e
e X
e ¼ V 1 þ μ1r
P X; Y ¼
1 þ μ1r
 r ; D Y;
:
½25
1r
1r
Total litigation expenditures are given by
r
V
½26
1r
Obviously, this Nash equilibrium exists if and only if the indemnification limit is
larger than the equilibrium investments, i.e. if and only if r < 1 and
e YÞ.
e Note that X
eT Y
e , μ T 1 and thus e
d>e
d ; maxðX;
d takes its minimum value
eþY
e¼
~E ¼ X
L

of

rV
2ð1rÞ

e Y
e < d is impossible for finite d and thus this
at μ ¼ 1. If r  1, X;

equilibrium fails to exist when r  1.


e X
e >  V and
Sub-Game perfection of this equilibrium requires D Y;


 
 1r
e Y
e > 0, which is equivalent to μp ; r 1r < μ < ~
μpP ; 1r
. This is posP X;
D
1r
r
sible only for r < 1=2. Note that these critical values of μ are independent of d and
e
are therefore vertical lines in Figure 2, where the reader also finds the graph of d.
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If 1=2  r < 1, no such case reaches the litigation stage: As soon as
1r1r
μ> r
, which is less than one, the defendant will refrain from litigating if


^ X
e  V. Hence, the plaintiff will file
the plaintiff files the case because D Y;
if and only if this condition is met.

4.3 Investment equals the indemnification limit
Investments equal to the indemnification limit yield expected payoffs of
P ðd; dÞ ¼

μ
μ
ðV þ 2dÞ  2d; D ðd; dÞ ¼ 
ðV þ 2dÞ:
1þμ
1þμ

½27

In order for this to be an equilibrium of the litigation stage, neither of the parties
must gain from increasing their investments beyond d or from lowering it below
d. We show in Appendix B.4 that the first of these conditions is equivalent to
^ Remember that for small indemnification limits, both parties invest the
d  d.
same amount larger than the limit. If we now increase the limit, investments will
grow (because this is equivalent to increasing the claim value) but less than the
indemnification limit (cf. equation (15)).21 Hence the equal investments will
eventually become equal to d. Increasing the limit a bit further will lead to an
equal increase of investments, because investing less than the limit becomes
even less attractive but, as we will argue immediately, investing more than the
limit is not attractive either.
As the indemnification limit grows larger, one can easily imagine that the
party with the weaker case will eventually cease to invest the full amount of the
indemnification limit. In fact, we show in Appendix B.4 that both parties will
refrain from lowering their investment below the indemnification limit if and
only if
8
rV
>
>
>
>
1
þ
μ  2r
>
>
>
<
rV
;
dd
>
1
þ
1=μ
 2r
>
>
>
>
>
>
:1

if μ  maxð1; 2r  1Þ
 1 
if μ  min 1; 2r1
if

½28

1
< μ < 2r  1
2r  1

21 Note that investments grow faster than the limit if r > ð1þμÞð1 þ 1=μÞ ¼ 2  2; which is
^ ¼ 1:
equivalent to never have investments equal to or smaller than the limit, d
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 increases in μ if μ < 1 and
Obviously, the last case may only occur if r > 1. Since d

decreases in μ if μ > 1, d reaches its maximum at μ ¼ 1. The value of this
rV
~
maximum is 2ð1rÞ
, i.e. equal to the minimum value ov d.
For X ¼ Y ¼ d being a subgame perfect equilibrium of the entire game, we
also need D ðd; dÞ  V and P ðd; dÞ  0 which reduces to
D ; V
dd
2μ

P ; Vμ
and d  d
2

½29

Comparing eqs [28] and [29] immediately shows that r  1=2 implies
  min½d
P ; d
D  so that if X ¼ Y ¼ d is the Nash equilibrium of the litigation
d
stage, it is also a subgame perfect equilibrium of the entire litigation game.
 > min½d
P ; d
D  and thus litigation with
However, if 1=2 < r < 1, we have d
^


P ; d
D  reaches
X ¼ Y ¼ d only takes place if d  d  min½dP ; dD . Note that min½d
its maximum V=2 at μ ¼ 1. The indemnification limit being less than half of the
claim value is thus a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a
range of μ for which litigation with X ¼ Y ¼ d is subgame perfect when 1=2 < r < 1.
  rV  V , the same condition is also necessary
Since for r  1=2 we have d
2ð1rÞ
2
(though not sufficient) for the existence of a range of μ for which litigation with
X ¼ Y ¼ d is subgame perfect when r  1=2. The intuition of this insight is
straight forward: if both parties invested exactly the amount of the indemnification limit and this limit were more than one half of the claim value, then at least
one of the parties would plausibly prefer to give up rather than litigating.
P ; d
D   d
^ for all μ, which implies that
Finally, for r  1 we always get min½d
litigation with X ¼ Y ¼ d is never a subgame perfect equilibrium of the entire game.
When X ¼ Y ¼ d is a Nash equilibrium of the litigation stage but not a
subgame perfect equilibrium of the entire game,22 then the plaintiff will file
D , since the defendant will not defend.
and the defendant settle whenever d > d

4.4 Investment of one party equals the indemnification limit
and investment of the other party is lower
Eventually, as d grows further, the party with the weaker case, i.e. the
defendant if μ > 1 and the plaintiff if μ < 1, will cease to invest the entire
 as we show in
amount of the indemnification limit. This occurs when d > d,
Appendix B.5.
P ; d
D  < d < d
 – i.e. for large enough d when 1=2 < r < 1 –
22 Recall that this is true when min½d
and always when r  1
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For r < 1, the weaker party’s investment will then be the unique solution of
ð@D ðd; YÞÞ=ð@Y Þ ¼ 0 for Y and ð@P ðX; dÞÞ=ð@X Þ ¼ 0 for X.23 We label these
e
e
investments YðdÞ
and XðdÞ,
respectively.24 We note that these investments
converge to zero as r grows towards one. For r  1 we have
ð@D ðd; YÞÞ=ð@Y Þ < 0 for all 0  Y  d and μ > 1 and ð@P ðX; dÞÞ=ð@X Þ < 0 for
all 0  Y  d and μ < 1. The weaker party will thus invest nothing in this case.
e
e
We therefore define YðdÞ
¼ 0 and XðdÞ
¼ 0 for r  1.
e
In Appendix B.5, we show that d is the stronger party’s best reply to XðdÞ
or,
 < d  d.
~ Hence in this range one party
e
YðdÞ,
respectively, for the entire range d
investing an amount equal to the indemnification limit and the other party
spending less is the Nash equilibrium of the litigation stage.
We show in the Appendix that the resulting payoffs can only be determined
e
as functions of YðdÞ
and are given by
1e
1re
e
e
P ðd; YðdÞÞ
¼ V  YðdÞ
dÞ ¼ ðV þ dÞ þ
and D ðYðdÞ;
YðdÞ
r
r

½30

for μ > 1 and by
1re
1e
e
e
dÞ ¼
¼  XðdÞ
P ðXðdÞ;
XðdÞ  d and D ðd; XðdÞÞ
r
r

½31

for μ < 1.
For r  1=2, we show in Appendix B.5 that the stronger party will not abstain
e
> 0 and μ < 1 implies
from litigation, i.e. that μ > 1 implies P ðd; YðdÞÞ
e
e
D ðd; XðdÞÞ >  V. Hence, the defendant will defend if D ðYðdÞ;
dÞ >  V and
e
the plaintiff will file if P ðXðdÞ;
dÞ > 0, which simplifies to
d



rV 1  r 1r
μ
r



1  r 1r
and d  rVμ
r

½32

 i.e.
respectively. Note that for r ¼ 1=2 these conditions coincide with d ¼ d,
litigation with one party investing d and the other less does not occur any more.
For 1=2 < r < 1, the weaker party always prefers not to file or, respectively,
e
e
not to defend to litigation, because D ðYðdÞ;
dÞ >  V would imply YðdÞ
> d and
e
e
P ðXðdÞ; dÞ > 0 would imply XðdÞ > d which contradicts the assumption of this
equilibrium. Hence the defendant’s decision will be litigation if and only if
e
D ðd; XðdÞÞ
>  V and the plaintiff would file if he could expect the defendant
e
to litigate if and only if P ðd; YðdÞÞ
> 0. Since these inequalities fail to have

23 We prove existence and uniqueness of these solutions in Appendix B.5
e ¼ Yð
e XÞ
e and
24 The abuse of notation is less severe than it seems on first sight since Y
e
e
e
X ¼ XðYÞ.
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explicit solutions for d, we restate the conditions in terms of μ: the defendant
will defend and the plaintiff would file if, respectively,
 r
 
1 rV
d
d þ rV rV r
μ
and μ  r
:
½33
r d þ rV rV
rV
d
Note that the defendant will stop litigating before μ grows large enough to
induce the plaintiff to file even if the defendant litigates.
Finally, if r  1, the weaker party will invest nothing in the Nash equilibrium
of the litigation stage and thus the weaker party will always avoid litigation: if
 < d and μ < 1, the plaintiff will not file and if d
 < d and μ > 1, the defendant will
d
settle.

4.5 Litigation under limited fee shifting: a summary
Putting together the results obtained in the four preceding Sections, we see that
parties’ choices about whether to litigate and how much to invest are directly
influenced by the indemnification limit d and by the relative strength of their
cases μ. This influence strongly depends on the level of the effectiveness of legal
expenditures r. Figure 2 illustrates four different levels of r: two less than one
half, one between one half and one, and one larger than one.
^ d
 and e
The solid lines in the figure represent d,
d from bottom to top. Hence,
below the lowest solid line, the equilibrium investments at the litigation stage
^ and Y^ (Section 4.1). Between the lowest and the second line from the
are X
bottom, equilibrium investments at the litigation stage are d (Section 4.3). If we
move above the second solid line, we enter the parameter range where only one
party would invest d in the litigation stage and the other invests less (Section
4.4). Finally, above the highest of the three solid lines, which does not exist for
r > 1, the equilibrium investments are both less than the indemnification limit d,
^ and Y^ (Section 4.2). It becomes apparent from the figures that the
namely X
Nash equilibrium of the litigation stage is unique for all parameter sets. The
proof of uniqueness is in the appendix.
We also observe that the sequence of types of the Nash equilibrium resulting
^
from increasing the indemnification limit d is always the same: low d entail X
and Y^ as equilibrium investments, somewhat larger d result in both parties
investing the full amount of the indemnification limit, and if we further increase
d, we will eventually end up in an equilibrium in which the party with the
stronger case still invests d, while the party with the weaker case invests less – a
strictly positive amount if r < 1 and zero else. Only if r < 1, the equilibrium
investment of the stronger party rests below d, too, if d becomes very large.
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e and Y,
e are independent of
Then both parties’ Nash-equilibrium investments, X
d. Careful inspection of the Nash-equilibrium expenditures show that the stronger party’s investments monotonously grow in d, with monotonicity being strict
except for very high d. The weaker party’s investments however only grow in the
first two types of equilibria, i.e. in those equilibria where both parties invest the
same amount in the litigation-stage Nash equilibrium. If the weaker party
spends less than the stronger party, her investments decline in d.
However, to fully understand the effects of the indemnification limit, we
have to incorporate the first two stages of the litigation game as well. Since the
participation constraints could not be solved explicitly for d for all four cases,
we rephrase them as inverted functions μpD ðdÞ and μpP ðdÞ where the superscript p
denotes the participation constraint. To capture the various cases, we write
^D and d
^P . Similarly, we write 
μ pD ðdÞ and ^μ pP ðdÞ as inverse functions of d
^
μpD ðdÞ
p


and μP ðdÞ as inverse functions of dD and dP . Recall that these functions do not
exist for r  1=2.
<d<d
~ is more complex. We have to differDefining μpD ðdÞ and 
μpP ðdÞ for d
entiate the three cases we discussed in Section 4.4. For r  1=2, 
μpP ðdÞ for

~
d < d < d are defined by the inverses of the two expressions in eq. [32]. For
<d<d
~ are equivalent to the right-hand sides of eq. [33].
1=2 < r < 1, μpP ðdÞ for d
<d<d
~ are the upper and the lower branch of the
Finally, for r > 1, μpP ðdÞ for d
^
inverses of d.
 r 1r
 1r
With ~μpD ; 1r
and ~
μpP ; 1r
, we then get
r
8 p
μ pP ðdÞÞ if r > 1=2 and d  V 2r1
ð^
μ D ðdÞ; ^
>
2
>
>
>
p
p
2r1
>
ð
μ
ðdÞ;
μ

ðdÞÞ
if
r
>
1=2
and
V
<
d  rV
>
P
2
>
> D
8
>
>
<
>
< r  1=2 and d  rV or
ðμpD ðdÞ; μpP ðdÞÞ ; ð
p
p
r2 V
μP ðdÞÞ if 1=2 < r < 1 and rV < d  1r
or
μD ðdÞ; 
>
>
>
>
:
>
>
>
r

1
and
d
>
rV
>
>


>
>
: ð~
r2 V
μpD ; ~
μpP Þ
if r < 1 and d > max rV; 1r

½34

The conditions on d reflect that the different variants of μpD ðdÞ and μpP ðdÞ are
valid only for the corresponding types of equilibria. It turns out that these
functions are continuous with kinks at the critical values of d.
As discussed earlier, filed cases are defended only if μ  μpD ðdÞ. Knowing this,


the plaintiff exploits his first-mover advantage and files if μ  min μpD ðdÞ; μpP ðdÞ .
Hence only cases with μpP ðdÞ  μ  μpD ðdÞ will be filed and defended, and thus
litigated. We shaded the corresponding range in Figure 2. Only for these cases the
Nash equilibrium investments are marked in the figure.

132

E. Carbonara et al.

If r < 1=2, only the extreme cases are not litigated. This is true even when the
indemnification limit is very large, because the parties will invest an amount
which is smaller than (and independent of) the limit, if the latter is large
enough. If r  1=2, parties will litigate those cases in which they both invest
the same amount (at least equal to the indemnification limit). However, not even
all of these cases are litigated 
in the subgame
perfect equilibrium: if the indem
nification limit is below min V2 ; Vð2rÞ
,
parties
will litigate only cases with
2r
relatively equal merits, with the symmetric range of values of μ which are
litigated declining in d, down to zero when d reaches the aforementioned critical
level. If the indemnification limit is larger, no case will be litigated. Cases with
rather similar merits and cases in which the plaintiff’s merits are stronger will be
filed but not defended, the remaining cases will not be filed.

5 Selection of cases and crowding-out of
undesirable litigation
In this Section we unveil a hidden virtue of the English rule. It will be shown
that reducing overall litigation costs may not be the only effect of the English
rule, but another important effect might be that of encouraging litigation that
promotes certainty in the legal system. The effect is non-trivial. Particularly,
under the English rule, an increase in the fee-shifting limit d produces a desirable sorting of litigated cases.
Under the English rule with limited fee-shifting, we have to distinguish between
a high indemnification limit (d > dmax ; min½rV; 21 V; 2r
2r V) and a low one
(d < dmax ). When d > dmax , parties always spend less than the limit. They litigate if
and only r < 21 (implying that dmax ¼ rV) and participation constraints are satisfied,
 r 1r
 1r
so 1r
< μ < 1r
. If they litigate, their equilibrium expenditures are given by
r
e Y
e < d. In such a case, a change in the indemnification limit has no impact on the
X;
 r 1r
 1r
extent of litigation, since neither 1r
nor 1r
depend on d.
r
The case with d < dmax is however rather interesting. As is apparent from
Figure 2, and may easily be proven by taking derivatives of the relevant sections
of μpP ðdÞ and μpD ðdÞ with respect to d, an increase in d reduces the extent of
litigation. Starting from d ¼ 0, which is the American rule, increasing d up to
dmax monotonously shrinks the range μpP ðdÞ < μ < μpD ðdÞ where litigation takes
place. If r < 1=2, the range eventually (at d ¼ dmax ¼ rV) is reduced to
 r 1r
 1r
μpP ðdÞ ¼ 1r
< μ < μpD ðdÞ 1r
. If r  1=2, the range of litigation vanishes
r
1
2r
at d ¼ dmax ¼ min½2 V; 2r V. To visualize the effect in Figure 2, the reader may
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Figure 3: Crowding-out effect of an increase in d.

imagine moving a horizontal line that stretches across the entire gray area
upwards from zero to r or the upper tip of the gray area.
Figure 3 below shows the crowding out effect of an increase in fee-shifting
under the English rule when d < V2 and in the special case r ¼ 1. In that case,
parties spend more than the limit d. The solid lines represent the parties’ payoffs
when d ¼ 0:2 and V ¼ 1. Parties litigate when payoffs are positive. The plaintiff’s payoff is represented by the increasing function: the greater the merit of her
case μ, the larger her expected gains from litigation. The plaintiff files the case
for μ > ^μP . The decreasing line represents the difference between the defendant’s
^ D ).
loss in case of no-defense, V, and the expected loss in case of litigation (
When that difference is positive, the defendant prefers to litigate (i.e., when
μ < ^μ). Hence, litigation occurs for ^
μP < μ < ^
μD , which, in our example, is equal to
μP ¼ 0:61, while ^μD ¼ 1:64. The dashed lines represent the parties’ payoffs for
^
higher levels of fee-shifting, d ¼ 0:4. The region in which litigation occurs
0
0
shrinks considerably as d increases (now ^
μP ¼ 0:89 and ^
μD ¼ 1:12). Moreover,
the defendant’s incentives to litigate decreases more than the plaintiff’s. In fact,
0
0
μD  ^μD ¼ 0:52, whereas ^
^
μP  ^
μP ¼ 0:28.
These results are summarized in the following Proposition.
Proposition 1 Under the English rule, an increase in the amount of recoverable
legal fees, d, reduces the extent of litigation as long as d < dmax for cases characterized by very low or very high merit. Litigation persists in the medium range,
where parties’ claims have comparable merits and where adjudication and legal
precedents can reduce legal uncertainty. When d  dmax , litigation is restricted to
cases with nearly equal merits for plaintiff and defendant if r < 1=2 and does not
take place if r  1=2.
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Thus, we find that increasing the cap on recoverable legal fees may decrease
the total number of cases contested, but increases average expenditures in those
cases that do end up being litigated. The question now, with respect to total
litigation expenditures across a society, is which of the two opposing currents
prevails, i.e., whether higher per-case litigation costs are offset by the lower
volume of litigation.
In general, the effect of an increase in d depends on the distribution of μ in
the population of litigants. If the values of μ that are still litigated after the
increase in d are also the most frequent in the population, it is highly likely that
an the increase in expenditure for each single litigated case dominates the
reduction in contested cases. However, for r  0 the number of litigated cases
and thus the total expenditure on litigation is reduced to zero when d  dmax .
Thus long before the indemnification limit reaches this level, total litigation
expenditures must start to decline in d.
Conversely, close to d ¼ dmax , reducing the limit to fee shifting increases
total litigation expenditures – an effect entirely contrary to the very purpose of
lowering the cap on recoverable litigation costs. This interesting and counterintuitive result suggests that the proper policy might be to increase the cap on
recoverable legal fees, d if the reduction of litigation expenditures is a policy
goal. This is especially true in close cases (μ  1) and when a high r induces
large expenditures.

6 Comparing the American and the English rule
with limited fee-shifting
Building on the analysis presented above, in this Section we consider the main
effects of the two fee-shifting regimes under consideration. Thus far we have
discussed the effect of an increase in d in a regime with limited fee-shifting. It is
interesting to analyze what happens when we move from an American to an English
regime, i.e. from an indemnification limit of d ¼ 0 to some strictly positive limit.
From the preceding analysis we know that parties always litigate under the
1
American rule if r  1, and they litigate if r  1 < μ < r1
for 1 < r  2.
Assume that there is a change in regime and that the prevailing rule
becomes an English rule with a fee-shifting limit, d. In this case we know that
less litigation occurs, that litigation is more concentrated on cases with more
equal merits, and that total expenditures of the two parties are larger.
Are these effects of moving from the American to an English rule with a
specific, strictly positive fee-shifting limit d desirable or undesirable per se? If we
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only look at extremely large (or non-existing) limits and concentrate on cases in
which r  1=2, it seems that they are undesirable. In that case litigation is not
merely reduced in numbers, it is driven to zero and – what is more disturbing –
the plaintiff controls much of the outcome of each controversy. If the plaintiff’s
relative merit is high enough, the defendant does not defend the case, whereas if
μ is low, the plaintiff does not file. Since μpD ðdÞ < 1 whenever litigation is
excluded for all μ, the plaintiff wins the case without going to trial even if the
merits of her case are somewhat weaker than the merits of the defendant’s case.
The plaintiff gains from having the first-mover advantage, as Farmer and
Pecorino (1999) rightly stress.
However, it should be noted that when the indemnification limit is not so
extreme (or if r < 1=2) the cases that do not reach trial under the English rule
(and that would reach trial under the American rule), are those for which there is
little legal uncertainty, because they are characterized by either very low or very
high μ.
In general, all cases for which there is no legal uncertainty are better
resolved outside of court for two reasons. First, contesting the claim will be a
waste of resources for the weaker party. Second, litigating claims that have little
legal merit may create uncertainty. This is particularly true in cases where the
point of contention is legal rather than factual. Suppose that the party with
weaker case wins. This creates a new precedent contrary to established law, and
the outcome of subsequent litigation becomes more uncertain.25
We should therefore conclude that socially valuable litigation involves cases
for which legal uncertainty is already high, so that legal expenditure, even if
higher as it is under the English rule, is worthwhile – adjudicating close cases is
valuable, because it clarifies the state of the law. Therefore, a good rule should
favor litigation of those cases with μ close to 1 and discourage litigation the
farther we move away from 1.
Serendipitously, the English rule (as compared with the American rule) possesses precisely this characteristic. Fewer cases with high or low μ make it to the
court, and therefore it may be more desirable than prior researches have indicated.26
25 Clearly, the creation of legal uncertainty leading to legal innovation is desirable in those
cases in which the precedent is obsolete, but we reckon that at any moment in time, the number
of cases with this characteristic is relatively small.
26 A rather common idea is that a litigation rule is efficient if it favors the objective merits, i.e.,
it induces the plaintiff to file only when he is favored by the objective merits (μ > 1) and the
defendant to defend if and only if μ < 1. This result is attained by the American rule when r ¼ 2
and by the (unlimited) English rule when r ¼ 21. Thus, either rule can have attractive properties
in this respect. Moreover, if there were fixed costs of proceeding to trial (that do not affect the
probability of success) then the type of efficiency referred to above might be reached for lower
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7 Conclusions
In addition to resolving particular disputes, litigation often generates the secondary benefit of creating precedents and clarifying legal principles. New litigation allows judges to decide novel issues and to settle vagueness and ambiguity
in prior case law.
In the context of this lawmaking function, the social value of litigation is
greatest when the state of the law is obscure: a new court precedent can
establish clarity and certainty in the law. Miceli (2010) recently articulated the
conundrum that litigants’ incentives to litigate are driven by private cost-benefit
considerations, and therefore contested cases are not necessarily those that yield
the most social value.27
In this paper we have extended the rent-seeking model of litigation to show
that the adoption of the English rule will often promote a “favorable selection”
of cases, crowding out of less desirable cases. The adoption of the loser-pays
principle reduces the wedge between the private and social incentives to litigate,
promoting the adjudication of close cases, where the existing law is either
unsettled or ambiguous. Our results provide a more solid foundation to the
claim that moving from an American to an English rule reduces overall litigation
but increases litigation costs per case. An increase in d can in fact be considered
a continuous shift from the American (d ¼ 0) to the pure English rule
(d unlimited). The higher d, the further away we move from the American
towards the English rule.
Moreover, within a fee-shifting regime, we have shown that, in order to
reduce litigation, it may be preferable to increase the limit to fee shifting rather
than decrease it, which, at first sight, might seem quite paradoxical. It is often
advocated that a more stringent definition of reasonable legal expenditure
would be a good instrument to discourage frivolous litigation. We have proven
that not only a less stringent definition may be preferable but also that, for very
low values of r or an already high d, a change in the fee-shifting limit may
simply be ineffective, so policy makers should recur to different instruments.

values of r. For instance, if r ¼ 1, a fixed cost of V4 would suffice to guarantee that parties
litigating under the American rule file and defend only when favored by the objective merits. A
similar result could be proven for the English rule. However, this kind of efficiency would not
necessarily lead to the crowding-out of less desirable cases.
27 Shavell (1982), Menell (1983) and Kaplow (1986) first raised the question on whether
plaintiffs have the socially efficient incentives to use the legal system to resolve a dispute.
See also, Shavell (1997) and Miceli (2009).
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We have developed a full-fledged model of various fee-shifting regimes and
analyzed their performance for all the admissible values of r, thus providing the
most complete analysis of alternative fee-shifting regimes to date.
Admittedly, the sorting effect of the English rule may undermine the access
to justice of low-probability cases that would bring to the court new, progressive
issues. Any new legal claim faces the inertia of an incumbent legal system. At
the outset, any new legal right is born through the filing of a low probability
claim. Discouraging low-probability litigation may therefore have the undesirable side effect of trimming out and inhibit the filing of claims that might be
conducive to the creation of new legal rights. This may explain the reason why
several legal systems that belong to the English-rule procedural tradition disapply the loser-pays rule when litigation – successful or unsuccessful as it might
have been in the specific case – is representative of an attempt to challenge an
established legal rule, with potential benefits in terms of legal progress and
evolution. Future extensions of our model may therefore consider possible
variations of the loser-pays rule to facilitate access to justice and to foster the
advancement of new legal claims that may advance the evolution of legal
system. Further, our results also explain the practice, adopted by many legal
systems employing the English rule, of carving out an exception to the feeshifting policy when the court deems a case socially valuable for establishing
case law or when the settled legal precedents become obsolete.
Finally, our paper does not consider litigation opportunism (or“predatory
litigation”), where one party takes another to court even if he knows that the
other has fulfilled his obligations (see Kirstein and Schmidtchen, 1997). It would
be extremely interesting, as a future research development, to analyze the
impact of various fee-shifting regimes, with and without fee-shifting limits, on
the incentives to keep such opportunistic behavior.

Appendix A: Subgame-Perfect Nash
Equilibrium Under the American Rule
Following Farmer and Pecorino (1999), we show first that for r < 1, if the parties
reach the litigation stage, investment levels X  and Y  in [7] are a Nash equilibrium since neither party is willing to deviate. This occurs when exerting the
equilibrium effort is at least as good as not exerting any effort (either X ¼ 0 or
Y ¼ 0). The plaintiff is not willing to deviate if P ðX  ; Y  Þ  0, i.e., from [8],


μV
r
ð1þμÞ 1  1þμ  0, which reduces to μ  r  1.

138

E. Carbonara et al.

μV
Similarly, the defendant is not willing to deviate if ð1þμÞ
2 ð1 þ μ þ rÞ < V, i.e., if
1
and only if 1 þ μð1  rÞ > 0, that is if and only if μ < r1.

Case 1. r  1. It is possible to see that 1 þ μð1  rÞ > 0 always and that r  1 < 0 if
r  1. Hence neither parties are willing to deviate and, in case of litigation,
payoffs will be P ðX  ; Y  Þ and D ðX  ; Y  Þ. If the plaintiff files, the defendant will
defend. Knowing that the defendant always litigates, the plaintiff chooses to file.
Thus, when r  1, the litigation game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which litigation always occur.
1
Case 2. r > 1. In this case, both r  1 and r1
are positive, and neither party is
1
willing to deviate if and only if r  1 < μ < r1
. We now need to distinguish
between 1 < r  2 and r  2.
1
. Hence, there exists a range of values for μ
Case 2.1: 1 < r  2. In this case, r  1 < r1
1
such that r  1 < μ < r1 and the Nash Equilibrium X  ; Y  exists. In stage 2, the
defendant defends if the plaintiff files and, in stage 1, the plaintiff prefers to file.
1
If μ < r  1 < r1
, the plaintiff is willing to deviate in the litigation game,
hence the Nash equilibrium does not exist. Following Farmer and Pecorino
(1999), we assume that the player willing to play the Nash equilibrium solution
has a first-mover advantage in a Stackelberg litigation game. If litigation
occurs, the player with the first mover advantage sets her legal expenditure
at a preemptive level, which is the lowest expenditure that induces the other
party to invest 0. In this case, given that the plaintiff is willing to deviate, in
the litigation game the defendant has a first-mover advantage. Since
P P ð0; YÞ ¼ 0, the plaintiff’s payoff is zero, hence, in stage 1, she chooses not
to litigate.
1
Finally, if μ > r1
, the defendant is willing to deviate in the litigation game.
Here the plaintiff would have a first-mover advantage and the defendant would get
V. Then the defendant would not defend and in stage 1 the plaintiff would file.
1
Case 2.2: r > 2. In this case, r  1 > r1
. Again we can have three cases.
1
If μ > r  1 > r1, the defendant is willing to deviate from the litigation Nash
equilibrium whereas the plaintiff does not. The plaintiff therefore has a firstmover advantage. As in the previous case the defendant chooses not to defend
and, in stage 1, the plaintiff files.
1
If μ < r1
, the defendant has a first-mover advantage in the litigation game.
At stage 1, the plaintiff does not file.
1
The last case is the most problematic. If r1
< μ < r  1, both the plaintiff and
the defendant are willing to deviate from the Nash equilibrium strategies in the
litigation game. Therefore it is difficult to determine which player might have the
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first-mover advantage in a Stackelberg game. In this case, one of the players
might be able to commit to a preemptive level of expenditure (so that we are in
one of the scenarios described above).

Appendix B: Subgame-Perfect Nash
Equilibria Under the English Rule with
Limited Fee – Shifting
B.1 Proof of impossibility of Y  d < X
We show the impossibility by contradiction. For this, we first assume that
both inequalities hold true. Based on the consequential definitions of the parties’
payoffs, we then show that these investments cannot be a Nash equilibrium.
Suppose Y  d < X. Then
P ¼ V þ d  X 

Y r ðV þ d þ YÞ
Y r þ μX r

and D ¼ 

μX r ðd þ V þ YÞ
Y r þ μX r

With these payoffs, we get the following first order condition for the defendant:
μX r
þ μX r
þ


μX r
ðd þ V þ YÞrY r1

1
¼ r
Y þ μX r
ðY r þ μX r Þ

0¼

μX r ðd þ V þ YÞrY r1
ðY r

μX r Þ2



Yr

which simplifies to
1¼

rY r1 ðd þ V þ YÞ
Y r þ μX r

½35

It is useful to write this as:
μX r ¼ Y 1þr ðdr þ rV  Y þ rYÞ;
The defendant’s second order condition is:


μX r ðd þ V þ YÞr ðr  1ÞY r2 ðY r þ μX r Þ  2rY 2ðr1Þ
2μX r rY r1
0
þ
3
r
r
ðY þ μX Þ
ðY r þ μX r Þ2

μrX r Y r2
rðd þ V þ YÞðY r þ μX r Þ  ðd þ V  YÞðY r þ μX r Þ
¼
ðY r þ μX r Þ3

½36
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If we replace μX r as suggested by eq. [36] inside the brackets, this turns into:



μrX r Y r2
0
rðd þ V þ YÞ Y r þ Y 1þr ðdr þ rV  Y þ rYÞ
3
r
r
ðY þ μX Þ


 ðd þ V  YÞ Y r þ Y 1þr ðdr þ rV  Y þ rYÞ
¼

μrX r Y 2r3
ðY r þ μX r Þ3

ðr  1Þrðd þ V þ YÞ2

Hence, Y  d < X can only be an equilibrium if r < 1.
We now turn to the plaintiff’s foc. It is given by:
0 ¼ 1 þ

rY r ðd þ V þ YÞμX 1þr
ðY r þ X r μÞ2

½37

Inserting eq. [36] yields:
0 ¼ 1 þ

YμX 1þr
Y
Y
¼ 1 þ 
X rðd þ V þ YÞ
Y r þ μX r

Then by our initial assumption we have:


Y
d<X ¼ Y 1 
rðd þ V þ YÞ
which implies
0 <  rd2  drV þ rVY  Y 2 þ rY 2

½38

As we already know that r < 1, inequality [38] also implies
0 <  rd2  drV þ rVY
or
Y >d

dþV
>d
V

which contradicts the initial assumption. Hence, there is no equilibrium with
Y  d < X. By symmetry, we also cannot have an equilibrium with X  d < Y. q.e.d.

B.2 Equilibrium with X; Y > d
^ Y
^ > d defined by the first-order
We first check whether investment levels X;
conditions of maximizing P ðX; YÞ and D ðX; YÞ as defined by eqs [13] and
[14] constitute a Nash equilibrium of the litigation game. We know from standard rent-seeking theory that it is not sufficient to consider the first-order

Hidden Virtues of Limited Fee Shifting

141

conditions but that investing nothing may be a better alternative. However, the
e when the defendant invests
plaintiff is not willing to deviate if exerting effort X
e
Y yields a higher payoff than exerting no effort (X ¼ 0). This happens when
^ YÞ
^ >  d, that is, when 1 þ μ  r > 0. The latter inequality is always satisP ðX;
fied for r  1. For r > 1, it is required that the case presents μ > r  1.
^ XÞ
^ >  V  d,
Similarly, the defendant does not deviate if and only is D ðY;
which implies 1 þ μð1  rÞ > 0, which is always satisfied for r < 1 and requires
1
μ < r1
if r > 1.
^ XÞ
^ in the litigation stage, the defenKnowing that his payoff will be D ðY;
^ YÞ
^ >  V, i.e., if and only
dant is willing to defend in court if and only if D ðX;
e
if d < dD which we can invert to
qﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ð1  rÞV  2dr þ ð2dr þ ðr  1ÞVÞ2 þ 4dðd þ VÞ
μ < ^μD ðdÞ ;
½39
2d
The plaintiff, on the other hand, is willing to file if and only if the defendant will
^P which we can invert to
^ YÞ
^ > 0, that is d < d
not defend her case in court or P ðX;
qﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2dr þ ðr  1ÞV þ ð2dr þ ðr  1ÞVÞ2 þ 4dðd þ VÞ
μ > ^μP ðdÞ ;
¼ 1=^
μD ðdÞ
2ðd þ VÞ
½40
Equations [39] and [40] represent respectively the defendant’s and the plaintiff’s
^ Y^ > d
participation constraints. When they are satisfied, investment levels X;
28
constitute a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the litigation game.
^D > d
^ we note that the denominator of d
^ is
To see that for r  1=2 we have d
^D if and only if
always positive and the same is true for the denominator of d
pﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
^ If the
^
2
μ > 1 þ r  r < 1. Hence, if the latter condition is violated, dD ¼ 1 > d.
^
^
condition holds true, dD > d is equivalent to
r ðμ  1=μ þ 2rÞ ¼ ð1 þ 1=μ  rÞðð1 þ μÞð1 þ 1=μÞ  2rÞ

½41

which after some algebra reduces to r < 21 þ 2μ1 which is satisfied by assumption.
^P is the same as d
^D with μ replaced by 1=μ and d
^ does not change when
Since d
^P > d
^ if r  1=2.
we replace μ by 1=μ, exactly the same argument also proves that d
28 It is possible to show that, whenever a case is characterized by ^μP < μ < ^μD (participation
^ Y
^ is a Nash equilibrium in the litigation stage. In fact, X;
^ Y^
constraints are both satisfied), X;
1
constitute a Nash equilibrium when r  1. When r > 1, ^μP > r  1, whereas ^μD < r1
, which
^ Y
^ > d constitute a Nash
implies that whenever participation constraints are satisfied, X;
equilibrium.
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Obviously, if r > 1=2, the argument fails if μ or, respectively 1=μ is large enough.
^D is reversed for all μ  1 and the argument for d
^P
And if r > 1, the argument for d
^D ; d
^P  < d
^ for all μ.
is reversed for all μ  1, whence min½d

B.3 Equilibrium with X; Y < d
e and Y
e obtained in [24] are
We prove first that, for r < 1, investment levels X
always Nash equilibria of the litigation game. Following the same procedure
adopted for the American rule in Appendix A, the plaintiff does not deviate from
e Y
e if and only if P ðX;
e YÞ
e >  Y,
e which follows from the fact
the equilibrium X;
that the plaintiff has to pay the defendant’s legal fees even if her own expenditures are X ¼ 0. This implies that the plaintiff does not deviate if and only if
1
μ1r ð1  rÞ > 0, which is always true if r < 1. Similarly, the defendant does not
e XÞ
e >  V  X,
e which implies μ1r1 < 1 þ μ1r1 , which is
deviate if and only is D ðY;
always satisfied for r < 1. However, as shown in the text, the equilibrium fails to
exist if r  1.
The rest of the argument is in the text.

B.4 Equilibrium with X ¼ Y ¼ d
To prove the conditions under which X ¼ Y ¼ d is an equilibrium, we first show
^
that increasing the expenditures beyond d reduces the plaintiff’s payoff if d  d.
 The argument for the defendant is symWe then turn to the condition d  d.
metric and need not be made explicit here.
^ we first
To see that the plaintiff will not increase X above d when d  d,
consider her payoff
P ðX; dÞjXd ¼

Yr

μX r
ðV þ 2dÞ  X  d
þ μX r

½42

for X  d and its first derivative of at X ¼ Y ¼ d:
@P ðX; YÞ
@X

¼
X¼Y¼d

rμV  dðð1 þ μÞ2  2μrÞ
dð1 þ μÞ2

^
 0 due to d  d

^ The plaintiff will thus not increase his expenditures
with equality only for d ¼ d.
marginally above d.
To show that the plaintiff will not invest any much higher amount, we
consider the second derivative of her payoff:
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@ 2 P ðX; YÞ
rμð2d þ VÞX r2 ÞY r
¼
ðð1  rÞY r þ ð1 þ rÞμX r Þ
2
@X
ðY r þ μX r Þ3
Obviously, this is strictly negative if r  1. If r > 1, the second derivative is
positive for X ¼ 0 and eventually becomes negative as X increases. Leaving
aside the restriction that the definition in eq. [42] only is valid for X  d, one
can easily check that the right-hand side of [42] becomes d when X ¼ 0. Hence
this right-hand side must have been increasing in some range before X reaches
d. Since the first derivative is negative at X ¼ d, the derivative must have been
decreasing, i.e. the second derivative must have been negative somewhere in the
range 0 < X < d. However, a negative second derivative for any value of X implies
that the second derivative is negative for all larger values of X too. As a
consequence, ð@ 2 P ðX; dÞÞ=ð@X 2 Þ < 0 for all X  d which also implies that
ð@P ðX; dÞÞ=ð@XÞ < 0 for all X  d. Hence P ðX; dÞ < P ðd; dÞ for all X > d
^
whence the plaintiff will never increase his investments above d when d  d.
We can make a corresponding argument for the defendant to show that he will
^
never increase her investments above d when d  d.
We now turn to the claim that neither of the parties will reduce expenditures
 For this proof it is helpful to transform the plaintiff’s first-order
below d if d  d.
condition for a payoff maximum with X; Y < d
@P ðX; YÞ μrY r X r1 ðV þ X þ YÞ  Y r ðY r þ μX r Þ
¼
¼0
@X
ðY r þ μX r Þ2

½43

Y r ¼ μX r1 ðrðV þ X þ YÞ  XÞ:

½44

into

Inserting this into the second derivative
@ 2 P ðX; YÞ
rμX r2 Y r
¼
ðrðV þ X þ YÞðY r þ μX r Þ þ ðV þ X  YÞðY r þ μX r ÞÞ
@X 2
ðY r þ μX r Þ3
½45
implies
@ 2 P ðX; YÞ
rμX r2 Y r
¼
ð1 þ rÞrμX r1 ðV þ X þ YÞ2
2
@X
ðY r þ μX r Þ3

½46

Hence, for r < 1, there is no payoff minimum for the plaintiff in 0  X < d if
Y  d.
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Since for equal investments the derivative
@P ðX; YÞ
@X

¼

rμV  Yð1 þ þμ  2rμÞ
Yð1 þ μÞ2

X¼Y

½47

 and strictly so, if Y < d, the derivative is also strictly
is positive for Y  d  d
positive for all X < Y and thus the plaintiff will always invest more than the
defendant if Y < d and not less than the defendant if Y ¼ d if r < 1.
If r  1, any extremum in 0  X < d cannot be a maximum. Due to
 we get after some algebra P ð0; YÞ ¼ Y < P ðY; YÞ ¼
Ydd
μ
1þμ ðV þ 2YÞ  2Y. Hence the plaintiff will again invest not less than the defendant and due to inequality [47] she will invest more unless Y ¼ d.
By a symmetric argument for the defendant, we find that he also invests
more than the plaintiff if X < d and the same amount if X ¼ d.
Suppose that the defendant invests Y  d. Then for X  d we have
@P ðX; YÞ μrY r X r1 ðV þ X þ YÞ  Y r ðY r þ μX r Þ
¼
@X
ðY r þ μX r Þ2

½48

which for X ¼ Y simplifies to
@P ðX; YÞ
@X

¼
X¼Y

rV  Yð1 þ 1=μ  2rÞ
Yð1 þ μÞð1 þ 1=μÞ

½49

 if
which is obviously positive if 1 þ 1=μ  2r  0 and positive due to Y  d  d
1 þ 1=μ  2r > 0 by the following argument:
rV
rV
 1þ1=μ2r
which implies that the deriμ  max½1; 2r  1 implies that Y  1þμ2r
vative is positive and strictly so, if Y < d.
1
2r  1 > μ > 2r1
implies that 1 þ 1=μ  2r < 0 whence the derivative is positive.
1
rV
implies that Y  1þ1=μ2r
μ  min 1; 2r1
which implies that the derivative is
positive and strictly so, if Y < d.

By a corresponding argument, we also get
@D ðY; XÞ
@Y

¼
Y¼X

rV  Yð1 þ μ  2rÞ
0
Yð1 þ μÞð1 þ 1=μÞ

½50

with strict inequality for X < d.

B.5 Equilibrium with X < Y ¼ d for μ < 1 or Y < X ¼ d for μ > 1
To prove the various claims of Section 4.4, we first recall that according to
^ This sufficient condition was
eq. [48] ð@P ðX; dÞÞ=ð@XÞjX¼d is positive if d  d.
also necessary, if μ < 1, i.e. if the plaintiff is the weaker party (cf. the last
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^ and the plaintiff is the
alternative in the discussion of eq. [48]). Hence if d > d
weaker party, we have ð@P ðX; dÞÞ=ð@XÞjX¼d < 0 and thus the best reply of the
plaintiff to the defendant’s choice of d is some X < d (X > d is excluded by
Appendix B.1). The first-order condition for the optimal X is given by
@P ðX; dÞ
dr
¼
½μrX r ðV þ X þ dÞ  Xðdr þ μX r Þ ¼ 0
@X
Xðdr þ μX r Þ2

½51

e
We call this solution XðdÞ.
Since ð@P ðX; dÞÞ=ð@XÞjX¼d < 0 and limX!0 ð@P ðX; dÞÞ=ð@XÞ ¼ þ1 and the
e
derivative does not display any discontinuity between zero and d, XðdÞ
exists.
e
Since the second derivative at X ¼ XðdÞ can easily be shown to be negative for
e
r < 1 the solution XðdÞ
is unique.
e
To make sure that ðXðdÞ;
dÞ is a Nash equilibrium, we have to prove that d is
e
the defendant’s best reply to ðXðdÞ.
We know from the previous appendix, that
μ < 1 implies
@D ðY; dÞ
@Y

>0 ¼
Y¼d

@P ðX; dÞ
@X

^¼
ifd ¼ d
X¼d

rV
1 þ 1=μ  2r

½52

^ We thus
By continuity, the inequality prevails if d slightly increases above d.
have
@D ðY; XÞ μX r ðrY r1 ðV þ X þ YÞ  Y r  μX r Þ
>0
¼
@Y
ðY r þ μX r Þ2

½53

Hence we have X r < ðrY r1 ðV þ X þ YÞ  Y r Þ=μ. Inserting this into the second
derivative


@ 2 D ðY; XÞ
Y r1 μX r
rðV  X þ YÞ r2 ðV þ X þ YÞðY r  μX r Þ

;
¼
@Y 2
Y
YðY r þ μX r Þ
ðY r þ μX r Þ2
which strictly increases in X r , yields
@ 2 D ðY; XÞ
Y r2 μX r
<
ð1 þ rÞrðV þ X þ YÞ < 0
2
@Y
ðY r þ μX r Þ2

½54

Hence, reducing Y slightly results in a larger and thus still positive first
derivative. Reducing Y further step by step always results in ever larger first
derivatives and thus negative second derivatives by exactly the argument of
eqs [53] through [54]. Hence, the defendant always gains by increasing his
investment until he invests d, which completes the proof of d being the best
e
reply to XðdÞ.

146

E. Carbonara et al.

The symmetric argument works for μ > 1 and thus the plaintiff being the
stronger party.
To prove the payoffs of eqs [30] and [31], note that eq. [51] implies
h
ir
h
ir1
e
e
e
¼ μr XðdÞ
ðV þ XðdÞ
þ dÞ. Inserting this into the plaintiff’s
dr þ μ XðdÞ
payoff for μ < 1, yields:
h
ir
e
μ XðdÞ
1re
e
e
e
dÞ ¼
þ dÞ  XðdÞ
d¼
XðdÞ  d
h
ir ðV þ XðdÞ
P ðXðdÞ;
r
e
dr þ μ XðdÞ

½55

The other expressions in eqs [30] and [31] can be derived accordingly.
e
Finally, we show that for r  1=2, μ < 1 implies D ðd; XðdÞÞ
>  V. Suppose
X ðdÞ
1e
V
the reverse were true, i.e.  r d   d . We could then insert this into


e
V
XðdÞ
0¼μ
þ 1  μð1  rÞ

d
d

e
XðdÞ
d

!1r

which is but a rewritten form of eq. [51] and obviously declines in
this would imply
 1r


V
rV
rV
0μ
þ 1  μð1  rÞ 
d
d
d

½56
e
X ðdÞ
d

. Hence,

½57

and thus
μ>

 r
1 d
rV
1 d
>
r d þ rV d
r d þ rV

½58

where the last inequality follows from the fact that for r  1=2 the equilibrium
 that
e
with ðXðdÞ;
dÞ may only occur for d < rV. However we know from d > d
rV
μ < 1=ð d þ 2r  1Þ. Some simple algebra shows that this is compatible with
e
inequality [58] only if d > rV. Hence D ðd; XðdÞÞ
>  V must be true. The proofs
for the other claims in the same paragraph follow the same structure and are
omitted here.
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